INTRODUCTION
When things have been so bleak for so long, it is understandable that heterodox development economists underestimate change when it begins to unfold. This is certainly true of those of us who have been deeply critical of the extension of neo-liberalism across the developing world via the combined influence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank, private financial actors, the US and UK governments, neo-liberals in the developing world and the economics profession. Faced with a juggernaut of this sort, we can forgive ourselves for failing to recognize, let alone take any hope in, signs of change.
Forgiven, that is, if the stakes were not so high. But they are very high, indeed-and so we can not be quite so self-forgiving if in fact our pessimism leads us to discount too readily evidence of new aperture that could be exploited by heterodox economists that have long sought to expand both policy and ideational space in the developing world. Given the current state of flux in economic thinking and policy, it is important at this juncture to guard against premature conclusions that nothing significant has, can or will change as a consequence of the crisis.
Regrettably, some heterodox development economists and IMF observers have suggested that the current crisis has had (and is likely to have) only a minimal or even trivial effect on policy space and on ideas about policy in the developing country context. This view, which I term the "strong continuity view," is apparent in the work, for example, of Chandrasekhar and Ghosh [2011] and Weisbrot et al. [2009a] , and also among many civil society actors and organizations [e.g., Eurodad, 2009; Muchhala, 2009] . Other advocates of the strong continuity view include those who argue that the crisis is not likely to have a significant impact on economic theory and on the economics profession more broadly [e.g., Mirowski, 2010 , Hodgson, 2009 . Of course it is important not to mistake the crisis as proof of the demise of neo-liberalism, the defeat of the global financial community and/or the demotion of the US dollar as a key currency. I do not address here the "strong discontinuity" view since neither scholars nor civil society representatives are seriously advancing it.
In what follows, I argue against the strong continuity view in favor of one that is more nuanced and empirically grounded. I argue that the mixed and even chaotic response to the current global 3 financial crisis represents an historical moment of what I term "productive incoherence" that has displaced the constraining "neoliberal coherence" of the past several decades. By productive incoherence I refer to the proliferation of responses to the crisis by national governments, multilateral institutions (particularly the IMF) and the economics profession that to date have not congealed into any sort of consistent strategy or regime. The term is intended to signal the absence of a unified, consistent, universally applicable response to the crisis-both at the levels of rhetoric and policy. This incoherence is radically different from the response to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the reaction to which was remarkably coherent in terms of both rhetoric and policymaking. Indeed, the univocal response to the Asian crisis served to deepen the move to neo-liberal reform in the developing world through a variety of policy and ideational mechanisms [on responses to the Asian crisis, see Grabel, 2003a Grabel, , 2007 Singh, 1999; Wade, 2007] .
The responses to the current crisis that are emerging across the globe and within the IMF range from those that reflect substantial rhetorical and policy continuity with neo-liberalism to those that represent pronounced discontinuity in these two domains. For those like this author and others (e.g., Chang and Grabel, 2004; Gallagher, 2005; Shadlen, 2005; Wade, 2003) who have worried about neo-liberalism as a straightjacket over policy space in developing countries, the new incoherence may signal the tentative beginning of the end of a wrong-headed regime that granted excessive authority to the IMF, neo-liberal economists and the global financial community to set the parameters of acceptable, feasible policy choices in the developing world.
In this (albeit limited) sense, the present incoherence is productive, signaling as it does not the death of neo-liberalism, certainly, but erosion of the stifling consensus that has secured and deepened neo-liberalism across the developing world over the past several decades. It follows that we would make a grave error were we to prejudge the historical moment as one of certain inertia rather than potential rupture.
Advocates of continuity can certainly marshal compelling evidence. On the one hand, one of the most interesting and important institutional aspects of the current conjuncture is the degree to which the crisis has restored the IMF's authority (see below), just when long-standing critics of the Fund might have hoped for new institutional arrangements to manage crises. Moreover, in 4 some very important respects IMF assistance to countries in distress has followed its wellrehearsed script inasmuch as many conditionality programs continue to stress pro-cyclical policy adjustments, privatization and liberalization. Moreover, developing countries have secured only modest commitments for increases in their formal influence at the IMF as a consequence of the crisis. These facts are noteworthy, to be sure, but they do not represent the whole story.
On the other side of the ledger are promising signs that the neoliberal ideas and prescriptions of important economists and departments at the Fund are being challenged by the current crisis in ways that most of us did not anticipate. In response, at least some IMF economists are learning to live with serious departures from the old script. Most importantly in this regard, the crisis is having the effect of normalizing the use of capital controls in developing countries. I would suggest that this may represent the beginning of what may very well turn out to be the most significant expansion of policy space in the developing world of the past several decades. It is also the case that Fund staff have developed conditionality programs that--while still unduly harsh-display a degree of incoherence in two respects that we have not seen previously. First, while the Fund continues to advocate fiscal retrenchment, it also now routinely emphasizes the need for "pro-poor spending" to protect the most vulnerable from economic hardship. Second, there is striking lack of consistency in conditionality programs across countries. Indeed, the IMF's crisis response strategy is marked by ad hoc measures that reflect all sorts of differences across the countries where the IMF has asserted its influence. Missing here is the unyielding attachment to a global strategy of neoliberalism that has marked the Fund's interventions over the past several decades.
I will postpone until the end of this paper the usual and even necessary caveats about the resilience of neoliberal ideas and the fragility of the new policy space, and instead turn straight away to the main focus of this paper. My goals are straightforward. First, I intend to demonstrate that the response to the current crisis has in fact been incoherent in important respects, from "who's in charge here?" to "what is to be done?" As regards the former, we will see inter alia that the crisis has at once resurrected the IMF as a central actor in crisis management while exposing its diminished reach and influence as a consequence of the successful escapist strategies of large developing countries from the IMF's orbit. For the first time in recent 5 memory, the IMF finds itself forced to respond after the fact to developing country economic strategies that flout the neoliberal prescription. In this context, the institution has adopted a new flexibility concerning some aspects of policy that should be striking to long-term IMF watchers.
Associated with these changes, the "what is to be done?" question is being answered today more inconsistently and pragmatically than in the recent past. Second and equally important, I will show that this incoherence is in fact productive in the sense of expanding policy space for development. 
WHO'S IN CHARGE? THE RESURRECTION OF A DIMINISHED IMF IN A WORLD OF RELATIVELY AUTONOMOUS STATES
The IMF has had a dominant and controversial role in financial governance from the developing country debt crisis of the 1980s through the immediate aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. The IMF emerged from the East Asian crisis a greatly weakened institution in regards to its credibility around the world, the adequacy of its own financial resources, the size of its staff, and the geographic reach of its programs. Critics on both the left and the right railed against the institutions' mission creep, heavy handedness, ideological capture, domination by the US government and private financial interests, its myriad failures in East Asia prior to and following the crisis, and its excessively harsh and intrusive conditionality.
An important consequence of the Asian crisis and subsequent changes in the global economy was the loss of purpose, standing and relevance of the IMF. Indeed, prior to the current global financial crisis, demand for the institution's resources was at an historic low. Major borrowers (including Argentina, Brazil, and Ukraine) had repaid their outstanding debt to the institution and the Fund had contracted its staff [Kapur and Webb, 2006] from $105 billion to less than $10 billion, while just two countries, Turkey and Pakistan, owed 1 See also Best [2005] which argues that the international political and economic stability of the postwar WWII era depended on a carefully maintained balance between coherence and ambiguity.
2 In the years following the Asian crisis, the Fund eliminated as much as 15% of its staff [Thomas, 2009] . Note, however, that Ukraine returned to borrower status when it signed a $15 billion SBA with the Fund in July 2010.
3 SBAs are the IMF's basic short-term loan agreement.
6 most of the $10 billion [Weisbrot et al., 2009b] . The IMF's list of clients came to include primarily extremely poor countries that had no choice but to seek its assistance [Chorev and Babb, 2009] .
The current crisis has been good to the IMF [Chorev and Babb, 2009] At the same G-20 meeting several developing countries committed to purchase the IMF's first issuance of its own bonds: China committed to purchase $50 billion while Brazil, Russia, South
Korea and India each committed to purchase $10 billion. Thus, $90 billion of the $500 billion in new resources for IMF lending will come from countries that have traditionally not played an important role in Fund governance. The support for the Fund coming from developing countries is surely a landmark event at the institution. For our purposes what is most important about these new commitments is that they not only contribute to the Fund's resurrection, but also reflect the global power and autonomy of these rapidly growing economies (see below). The Fund is continuing to seek additional resources: indeed, since July 2010 the institution's management has sought to raise an additional $250 billion in funding from its members.
The reemergence of the IMF at the heart of the global financial system is significant since the IMF has played a central role in driving thinking about policy and circumscribing the actual policy space available to developing and transitional countries over the last three decades.
Whether the IMF will use its renewed influence and financial resources in familiar ways that explicitly constrain policy space or in new ways that expand the space for policy heterogeneity and experimentation will depend on many factors. Not least among these factors is the extent to which developing countries are ultimately able to use the financial crisis to enhance significantly their formal voting rights and informal influence at the Fund, and whether the IMF has to change course more than it has to date in order to maintain its absolute and relative influence in relation to competitor institutions and increasingly autonomous nations (see below). Those developing countries that have been able to maintain their autonomy during the crisis have used the resulting policy space to pursue a variety of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies and, lately, various types of capital controls (on the latter, see section 3). Their ability to do so indicates the degree to which the IMF's geographic reach has been compromised in the years following the Asian crisis. Equally important for the matter at hand, the behavior of these autonomous states has served as an example for less powerful states which, in turn, have reacted to the crisis in ways that were taken to be unimaginable in previous crises [DeMartino, 1999] .
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate just why the IMF has evolved in the ways that I will examine below, but it is likely that some combination of several factors is responsible.
There seems to be a pragmatic recognition by IMF leadership and staff that the institution has no effective choice but to amend its policy prescriptions, owing to its diminished influence in the developing world. Relatedly, there is concern at the IMF about existing and future competition In sum, then, the IMF has discovered new vitality as a first-responder to economic distress at the same time as it has faced diminished territory over which it can dictate economic policy. The newly resurrected institution faces a changed landscape. It no longer enjoys wall-to-wall influence across the developing world. The geography of its influence is now significantly curtailed as a consequence of the rise of relatively autonomous states in the developing world.
Equally important, even within its orbit of influence its economists are responding to the current crisis in some ways that diverge from their recent past practice. To that and related issues we now turn.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? PRODUCTIVE INCOHERENCE IN THE IMF'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
In what follows we probe the IMF's response to the crisis-teasing out signs of tension and ambiguity within its conduct during the crisis period. We will see that the IMF has at once demonstrated both more policy and ideational flexibility in certain dimensions than in the past when managing countries in crisis, while also holding fast to neo-liberal strategies in other regards. On balance one must conclude that the IMF's behavior has been incoherent during the current crisis. This nevertheless represents a substantial shift from its unified and coherent response to the Asian crisis. To illustrate this incoherence, I will focus first and foremost on the normalization of capital controls and then turn to the character of numerous SBAs (and other assistance packages) that it has signed during the crisis.
To preview our findings, we will see that when it comes to capital controls both the policy and rhetoric of the IMF have changed rather significantly, compared to the neo-liberal view that dominated in the Asian crisis context. There is nevertheless unsurprising evidence of tension and equivocation around this discontinuity. In contrast, there is clear rhetorical and policy continuity with neo-liberalism when it comes to the matter of the macroeconomic policies embodied in the design of the SBAs negotiated during the crisis. In contrast again, we will find policy continuity coupled with rhetorical discontinuity in the scope of conditionality, the on-going management of SBAs, and the attention to the poor and vulnerable. Table 1 summarizes these findings (though admittedly at the risk of failing to capture some nuance that appears in the subsequent discussion). The IMF's ambiguous and fluid stance on and response to the new capital controls makes it easier for other countries to follow suit, and it appears that they are doing so [DeMartino, 1999] .
In my view, the normalization of capital controls is the single most important way in which policy space for development has widened in several decades.
Capital controls were the norm in developing and wealthy countries in the decades that followed WWII [Helleiner, 1996] . 7 At that time, they were widely understood to be an essential tool of economic management. Policymakers deployed capital controls in order to enhance macroeconomic policy autonomy, promote financial and currency stability, protect domestic industries/sectors from foreign control or competition, and ensure the provision of adequate credit to favored sectors and firms at the right price [Epstein, Grabel, Jomo KS, 2004] . In the first several decades of its existence, the IMF supported capital controls, a position that was consistent with and reflected the views of the economics profession (and notably, the views of 7 Capital controls refer to a range of policies that are designed to manage international capital flows. They can and have taken many forms in various countries over time. For example, they have involved restrictions on foreign investment in certain sectors or assets, minimum stay requirements on foreign investment, restrictions on capital outflows, taxes on foreign investment, restrictions on access to the domestic or to foreign currencies or to holding bank accounts outside the country, etc. Then a notable development occurred. In the wake of the Asian crisis, IMF research staff started to amend their views of capital controls-modestly and cautiously to be sure. In the post-Asian crisis context, the intellectual center of gravity at the Fund and in the academic wing of the economics profession shifted away from an unequivocal, fundamentalist opposition to any interference with the free flow of capital to a tentative, conditional acceptance of the macroeconomic utility of some types of capital controls. Permissible controls were those that were temporary, market-friendly, focused on capital inflows, and were introduced only when the economy's fundamentals were mostly sound and the rest of the economy was liberalized [Prasad et al., 2003; Ariyoshi et al., 2000] .
Academic literature on capital controls in the decade that followed the Asian crisis reflected this that market-based measures could be introduced as a prudential measure." The report then finds that the IMF's support for capital controls increased after the Asian crisis. That said, the report acknowledges (correctly) that there was a lack of consistency in the IMF's advice on this matter during the post-Asian crisis period. Thus began the tepid, gradual and uneven practical and ideational process by which some types of capital controls came to be normalized conditionally by the IMF and by academic economists after the Asian crisis.
Although the seeds of an intellectual evolution had been planted in the post-Asian crisis context, there was push back in this period from stalwarts in the academic wing of the profession [e.g., Forbes, 2005; Edwards, 1999] . In addition, there was a real disconnect between the research of IMF staff, on the one hand, and advocacy for capital account liberalization by the institution's economists when they worked in the field with particular countries, on the other. This disconnect might be explained by the relative autonomy of different departments at the IMF, a lack of leadership from the top on capital controls, and the internal entrepreneurship of mid-range IMF staff when working in different contexts [Chwieroth, 2010] . Hence, despite the modest intellectual progress on capital controls that began after the Asian crisis, capital controls were 9 A review of thirty-seven empirical studies by Magud, Reinhart and Rogoff [2011] is more cautious on the achievements of inflow controls, though these findings are not inconsistent with those in Magud and Reinhart [2006] .
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still largely viewed as an exceptional measure that could achieve desirable outcomes only where state capacity was high and/or where investors were undeterred by controls because opportunities in the country were so attractive.
But something happened in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Policymakers in a range of developing countries quietly began to impose a variety of capital controls, often framing them simply as prudential policy tools (akin to what Epstein et al. 2004 termed "capital management techniques"). These controls are now becoming a part of the global financial landscape for several reasons that we will explore below. At the same time the ideas of economists at the Fund on capital controls have continued to evolve with the consequent effect of now normalizing this policy instrument.
The case of Iceland is particularly interesting for the discontinuity that it demonstrates in connection with the IMF's view of capital controls (in terms of both rhetoric and policy). December rules prohibited foreign exchange related to capital transactions and required domestic parties to submit all foreign currency that they acquired either from the sale of goods and services or in another manner to a domestic financial institution. These capital controls were designed to protect the Icelandic krona from collapsing due to capital outflows from the country.
(As soon as the crisis emerged, the krona depreciated by 70% and the stock market lost more than 80% of its value. Since most of Iceland's debt is denominated in foreign currency, the large currency depreciation had severe spillover effects on debt-service abilities.) Not surprisingly,
given the IMF's long-held allergy to capital controls, IMF staff were questioned repeatedly in news conferences on what seemed to be an abrupt about face. Fund staff repeatedly said the capital controls in the country were crucial to prevent a free fall of the currency, that they were explicitly temporary, and that it was a priority of the Fund to end all restrictions as soon as Ukraine all put capital controls on outflows in place to "stop the bleeding" related to the crisis [IMF, 2009b] . These reports neither offer details on the nature of these controls nor commentary on their ultimate efficacy, something that further suggests that capital controls-even (and most notably) on outflows-are increasingly taken for granted by the Fund.
The Brazilian case is notable since it illustrates both the evolution and continued equivocation in the views of Fund staff on the matter of capital controls. Moreover, it illustrates the policy space that is increasingly being appropriated by policymakers in developing countries that remain independent of the Fund. In late October 2009, Brazil imposed capital controls via a tax on portfolio investment. The controls were self-described as modest, temporary and marketfriendly, and were aimed at slowing the appreciation of the currency in the face of significant international capital inflows to the country. Initially they involved a 2% tax on money entering the country to invest in equities and fixed income investments, while leaving foreign direct investment untaxed. Once it became clear that foreign investors were using purchases of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) issued by Brazilian corporations to avoid the tax, the country's Finance Ministry imposed a 1.5% tax on certain trades involving ADRs.
The IMF's initial reaction to Brazil's controls on capital inflows was ever so mildly disapproving. A senior official said: "These kinds of taxes provide some room for maneuver, but it is not very much, so governments should not be tempted to postpone other more fundamental adjustments. Second it is very complex to implement those kinds of taxes, because they have to be applied to every possible financial instrument," adding that such taxes have proven to be "porous" over time in a number of countries. In response, no less than John Williamson (with Arvind Subramanian) indicted the IMF for its doctrinaire and wrong-headed position on the Brazilian capital controls, taking the institution to task for squandering the opportunity to think reasonably about the types of measures that governments can use to manage surges in international private capital inflows [Subramanian and Williamson, 2009] . But Williamson's criticism misses the point that in fact the IMF reaction was quite muted, especially in comparison conflict between Pakistan and the IMF over capital controls, but information on the content of these discussions or any conflict is unavailable at this time.
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with its unequivocal reaction to Malaysia's capital controls during the Asian crisis, and was likely intended not to deter Brazil (a new lender to the IMF) from its strategy but to warn other developing countries against following Brazil's lead down a policy path that the IMF views as a last resort. A week later the IMF's Strauss-Kahn reframed the message on Brazil's capital controls. The new message was, in a word, stunning: "I have no ideology on this"; capital controls are "not something that come from hell" [cited in Guha, 2009] .
As the crisis continues to grind on, other developing countries have implemented capital controls. Many of these are aimed at controlling capital inflows so as to reduce speculative or inflationary pressures and/or pressures on the currency to appreciate, while some target outflows.
In December 2008, Ecuador implemented a number of measures governing inflows and outflows. In terms of outflows, it doubled the tax on currency outflows, established a monthly tax on the funds and investments that firms kept overseas, and also sought to discourage firms from transferring US dollar holdings abroad by granting tax reductions to firms that re-invest their profits domestically. In terms of inflow controls, the government established a reserve requirement tax [Tussie, 2010] . announced what its officials awkwardly term a "quasi capital control" that governs short-term investment. Indonesia's new inflow controls seek to dampen speculation in the country via a one-month holding period for central bank money market securities, the introduction of longer maturity instruments, and new limits on the sales of central bank paper by investors and on the interest rate on funds deposited at the central bank [Wagsty, 2010] . In the same month, South
Korea also announced controls on inflows. These controls seek to reduce the risks associated with a possible sudden reversal of inflows, rising short-term foreign borrowing and the use of derivative instruments. The controls limit the amount of currency forward and derivatives trading in which financial institutions can engage, and limit the foreign currency loans extended by banks to local companies [Economist, 16 June 2010] .
Also in June 2010, Argentina and Venezuela implemented controls on outflows: in Argentina they involve stricter limits on US dollar purchases (Webber, 2010) , and in Venezuela they involve new restrictions on access to foreign currency [Mander, 2010] . Peru has been deploying a variety of inflow controls since early 2008. The country's reserve requirement tax (which is a type of control on capital inflows) has been raised three times between June and August 2010.
More recently, we have seen that sterilization and new capital controls are being layered over existing controls in efforts to mitigate the currency appreciation, inflation pressures and asset bubbles induced by the current flood of foreign investment into rapidly growing developing countries. 14 These inflows are intensifying as the prospects for and returns available in the US and the Eurozone grow ever bleaker. The response of investors and credit rating agencies to the myriad initiatives surveyed here?
Silence and, in some cases, tacit approval. The response by economists at the IMF has been the same.
14 As of this writing, currencies in some of these countries (e.g., Brazil) remain far too strong from the perspective of exports.
Inflationary pressures are also still a very serious problem.
20
Ambivalence and inconsistency in IMF practice on capital controls are echoed in its research and in the public statements of leading Fund officials. These evidence both a much more explicit and far-reaching acceptance of capital controls than we saw prior to and following the Asian crisis.
In the raft of reports that the IMF has issued in the context of the crisis, we find frequent mention of the protective role of capital controls. For example, an early IMF report on low-income countries states that the impact of the current crisis on banking systems in these countries has been modest insofar as " [t] he existence of capital controls in several countries and structural factors have helped moderate the direct and indirect effects of the financial crisis" (IMF 2009c:9, fn9).
That said, the IMF is trying to avoid going too far in embracing this policy instrument. One Fund report warns that capital controls should be considered only as a last resort. The costs of even temporary capital controls are enumerated with great care; e.g., a country "could as a last resort regulate capital transactions-though these carry significant risks and long term costs." Later on the report argues that "even temporary standstills will have long-lasting legal implications" important message that appears in Ostry et al. (2010] and elsewhere that "capital controls may have a role in the policy toolkit" is retained in the GFSR [see also IMF, 2010b] . It is also notable that the GFSR acknowledges conflicting empirical findings on capital controls among empirical researchers, and even acknowledges empirical work on the achievements of capital controls by 22 heterodox economists, such as Coelho and Gallagher [2010] . The subsequent GFSR's also retain the basic message on the legitimacy of capital controls, though they caution that they are to be considered a last resort [e.g., IMF, October 2010a:35; IMF, 2011b] .
Reports by IMF research staff and more official Fund documents issued through spring 2011 continue to cement the legitimacy of capital controls, making clear that they should be considered alongside taxes and other prudential measures, and that they have had positive macroeconomic accomplishments in many countries [IMF, 2011c , 2011d , IMF 2010d Ostry et al., 2011] . 15 Notably, capital controls are referred to innocuously in these latest reports as "capital flow management" techniques. 16 Note that the three April 2011 reports [IMF 2011c [IMF , 2011d Ostry et al. 2011; see also IMF 2010d] are not without problems.
They have generated controversy, most notably from some developing countries. This is because the new reports discuss capital controls as a last resort, they have raised suspicions as to whether the IMF will ultimately try to determine when controls are or are not legitimate, and they fail to take seriously the contribution of loose monetary policy in wealthy countries to the high levels of capital inflows to the developing world [Gallagher and Ocampo, 2011; Bloomberg.com, 6 April 2011] .
options" [cited in Johnston, 2010] . He argued in July 2010 that "it is just fair that these
[developing] countries would try to manage the inflows" as a last resort against a flood of investors pumping up inflation and asset values [cited in Oliver, 2010] . Strauss-Kahn reiterated the new mantra that capital controls are a legitimate part of the toolkit in a speech in Shanghai in
October 2010 [Strauss-Kahn, 2010] , while in the same month the director of the Fund's Western
Hemispheric department made a case (unsuccessfully) for the use of controls in Colombia owing to the rapid appreciation of its currency [Crowe, 2010] .
Top officials at the World Bank have also gone on record in support of capital controls. For example, Bank president Robert Zoellick had this to say of the reemergence of capital controls in Asia: "it's not a silver bullet but it doesn't surprise me that people are trying them and they may help at the margin" [cited in Gallagher, 2010b] . Another key Bank official, Hans Timmer, Director of its Development Prospects Group, also spoke of the legitimacy of controls on inflows in January 2011 remarks [Beattie, 2011] .
Given the inertia at the IMF, its recent rhetoric and actions mark by its standards a minor revolution. Change at the Fund has been uneven, to be sure, with one step back for every two steps forward. In the growing pile of reports that the Fund (and the World Bank) has issued in the context of the current crisis, we find positive statements about the protective role of capital controls followed immediately by warnings about their use only as a temporary, last resort, and an enumeration of the significant risks and potential long-term costs of capital controls. This should not be surprising. We should expect that long-held ideas-especially those that have hardened to the level of ideologies and been codified in institutional practices-have very long half lives (Grabel 2003b) . The process of changing these ideas and practices is necessarily uneven; moreover, progress will inevitably generate push back from within the institution itself.
Hence we should expect to find continuing evidence of tension and equivocation in future IMF reports and practice that preclude a clear and decisive Fund verdict on capital controls. In a footnote within a textbox that neutrally describes macroprudential policies in Asia, Latin America and Europe and capital controls in Latin America, the following statement appears "The IMF, the Financial Stability Board, and the Bank for International Settlements do not consider capital controls to be a part of the macroprudential toolkit" [IMF 2011a, fn2:40] .
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At the moment, this new openness towards capital controls on the part of the IMF is being tested.
Despite the deployment of new capital controls and other measures (such as sterilization and dollar purchases), rapidly growing developing countries still confront the triple threat of currency appreciation, inflation and asset bubbles. It is likely that the developing countries surveyed here (and perhaps others) will continue to find it necessary to expand or introduce additional capital controls. 18 It will be important to watch the IMF closely as it tries to fashion its response. It may be that the patience of economists at the Fund will be severely taxed as other countries test the limits of the developmental policy and ideational space that has arisen as a consequence of the crisis. What is clear from the foregoing is the tenuous situation in which the IMF now finds itself, as it has begun to acknowledge the reality of its diminished influence across the developing world and the necessity of capital controls in cases of financial disruption, while not wanting to lose control over just when, how and by whom this policy instrument is employed.
In late 2010 and early in 2011 the IMF provided us with an interesting vantage point from which to observe the continuing tension within the institution on capital controls. In several reports, Fund staff note that the institution is seeking to develop standards for the appropriateness of different types of controls [IMF, 2010d [IMF, , 2011c [IMF, , 2011d Ostry et al., 2011] . This effort is reminiscent of a project that was stalled by the Asian crisis. The current discussion of developing standards for controls was also given life by the French government, which seemed eager to use its new leadership of the G-20 and G-8 in early 2011 to give the Fund a role in coordinating capital controls via a code or mandate on the subject [Hollinger and Giles, 2011] .
Some ECB officials and representatives of the German government expressed support for this IMF role as well. The issue has since fallen off the European agenda (perhaps because of the French election, events in North Africa and the Middle East, and the continued fallout from the financial crisis in Ireland, Greece and Portugal). But the fact that the IMF tested the waters on 18 Some countries facing this threat remain committed to a liberal stance toward capital flows. Mexican, Turkish, Chilean and
Colombian policymakers have publicly rejected capital controls as a means of dealing with the appreciation of their currencies [Attwood, 2011; Crowe, 2010; Thomas, 2010; Thompson, 2011] . This is not to suggest that policymakers in these countries are sitting passively on the sidelines. These central banks have been buying dollars to try to stem the appreciation of their currencies.
And even in Colombia, policymakers implemented measures that they do not refer to as capital controls, but which clearly function as such. Colombian policy wisely prevents domestic banks from borrowing in foreign currency to lend in pesos, restricts the use of short-term finance for long-term projects, and limits bets in foreign exchange derivatives.
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the matter of controlling capital controls is instructive. Far more instructive is the fact that Brazil and numerous developing countries in the G-24 (a group of key developing countries that work through the Bank and the Fund) unequivocally and quite publicly rejected any such role for the Fund [Wagstyl, 2011; Reddy, 2011; G-24, 2011; Gallagher, 2011b] . Notably, the Fund has not issued a public response to this rebuke by developing countries.
Macroeconomic policy: The old normal (mostly)
We turn now to the macroeconomic policy changes that have been an integral part of the design of SBAs (and other assistance programs, such as the Exogenous Shock and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities) that the IMF has negotiated with countries in distress during the current crisis. The SBAs with transitional countries have been jointly funded by the IMF, the Bank, the EBRD and the EU and, in some cases, the Nordic countries. Across these many SBAs we find both continuity and some puzzling discontinuities with past IMF practice (see Table 1 ).
Policy and rhetorical continuities in the IMF's design of SBAs
A large number of recent studies of the SBAs and other assistance programs negotiated during the crisis have established that the IMF has promoted pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy adjustments or targets [UNICEF, 2010; Van Waeyenberge, et al. 2010; UN, 2010; Muchhala, 2009; Eurodad, 2009; Solidar, 2009; Weisbrot et al., 2009a] . Indeed, only two studies conclude otherwise, and both are self-congratulatory reports by the Fund [IMF 2009a . The evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that current IMF conditionalities are similar to those during the Asian and previous crises. For example, a study by Van
Waeyenberge et al. [2010] of thirteen low-income countries with IMF programs in place prior to and during the current crisis concludes that they preclude countries from utilizing countercyclical policies and public investment programs. Similarly, a study by Weisbrot et al. [2009a] of fortyone countries that had Fund programs in 2009 finds that thirty-one of these agreements involve tightening fiscal or monetary policy or both. Fund programs across the European periphery are also illustrative of the pro-cyclical policy adjustments that we have seen in previous crises.
Interestingly, in cases involving European countries, the EU and the German government appear to be going even further than the IMF in regards to demands for fiscal austerity (Lütz and Kranke, 2010.] 26 A few illustrative cases will suffice to substantiate the case for rhetorical and policy continuity in this area. Iceland's package of reforms was conditioned on the kinds of macroeconomic policies that we saw during the East Asian and other developing country financial crises. 19 These highly pro-cyclical macroeconomic polices induced intense, prolonged social unrest in the country.
Tension between the IMF and Iceland deepened during the late spring and summer of 2009 concerning cuts in public spending, an increase in the value-added tax (VAT) to 18% and an increase in income taxes, and the central bank's decision to reduce the interest rate on four occasions, from its initial high of 18% down to 12%. These tensions contributed importantly to the fall of the government, and led to a protracted game of chicken between the new Center-Left government and the IMF.
El Salvador signed an agreement with the Fund in January 2009 that also prevented it from using expansionary fiscal policy to counter a downturn. The agreement obligated policymakers to maintain a fiscal deficit of no more than 2.8% of GDP. The IMF has since allowed the deficit to rise to around 5%, and the government has committed to reduce it to 3.3% in 2011. Since El As this survey illustrates, IMF assistance is conditioned on the same kinds of pro-cyclical policy adjustments that we saw in previous crises. The rhetoric that is deployed to defend these procyclical policies is also taken from the same playbook. Indeed, Dominique Strauss-Kahn seemed to be channeling his predecessor at the IMF, Michel Camdessus, when he stated in June 2010 that he was "totally comfortable" with deficit cuts "even if it has some bad effect on growth" Moreover, as part of its new approach to conditionality, the Fund has made much of its new commitment to social and pro-poor spending during the current crisis. Indeed, the current SBAs can be distinguished on paper from those of the Asian crisis years by the IMF's emphasis on the importance of social protection for the most vulnerable. This commitment appears in two recent 23 The criteria for policy soundness under the FCL are so demanding as to render most developing countries ineligible for support. A country must have a sustainable external position, a capital account position dominated by private flows, a track record of steady sovereign access to international capital markets at favorable rates, a reserve position that is relatively comfortable, sound public finances, low and stable inflation in the context of a sound monetary and exchange rate policy framework, the absence of bank solvency problems that pose an immediate threat of a systemic banking crisis, and effective financial sector supervision, data transparency and integrity. One wonders whether the USA could qualify for this program! IMF reports, one that surveys fifteen SBAs between July 2008 and September 2009 [IMF, 2009a] and another that surveys diverse assistance packages in nineteen low-income countries during the same period [IMF, 2009e, especially Annex 3] . One example involves the IMF's stipulation that rather than eliminating the "13th month pension" in Hungary in response to fiscal difficulties, the government should put in place a cap on it to insulate poorer pensioners from the harshest effects of the crisis. There was a similar initiative in the SBAs with Lativa and Romania [Lütz and Kranke, 2010] . However, it is difficult to square this emphasis on protection of socially vulnerable groups with the severe fiscal constraints that are a key feature of so many of the current SBAs. The decline in tax revenues and official development assistance has further complicated the matter of financing programs of social protection during the crisis. On the practical matter of where the funding for social protection is to come from, especially in the short run, the IMF has been utterly silent. Table 2 ]; while 16 were told to rationalize, cut or narrow eligibility for transfer programs, 23 countries were advised to expand these programs [UNICEF, Table 2 ]. Other studies note that a few IMF programs have strong counter-cyclical elements. Notably, programs in Georgia, Mozambique, Niger, and São Tomé and Principé involve expansionary fiscal policy, and that of Tanzania involves both expansionary fiscal and monetary policy [Eurodad, 2009; Weisbrot et al., 2009a] . It is not at all clear why some program countries are being told to pursue countercyclical fiscal adjustments, while others are being pushed in the opposite direction. This is suggestive of the ad hoc nature of the IMF's response to the current crisis. In this context, it is important to note the IMF's de facto movement away from the standard "one size fits all" approach of the past, even if the institution has not yet gone so far as to repudiate that approach or to announce a replacement.
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programs of liberalization and privatization, 25 it has also exhibited a degree of flexibility that was absent during its response to the Asian financial crisis. In particular, to a very limited extent it has relaxed fiscal constraints in some countries facing crisis, and has emphasized the need to protect the dispossessed even in the face of what it takes to be the need to impose fiscal and monetary discipline. Although it has failed to move beyond rhetoric in these regards, the rhetoric itself marks an important break with the past that legitimizes a concern for the poor as a criterion for evaluating Fund policies in the future.
Moreover, and much more importantly, the IMF has begun to reverse its position on capital controls-in word and in deed. Intentionally or not, its practice in this regard is contributing to the normalization of capital controls as a tool of prudential macroeconomic management. In a context of increasingly autonomous states and geographically curtailed IMF influence, a raft of developing countries have availed themselves of the new policy space that they enjoy to regulate international capital flows. Developing countries have even publicly rejected the IMF's apparent new interest in developing a code governing the appropriate use of capital controls. The Fund's response has been inconsistent-ranging from outright insistence upon capital controls, to tepid support, to equally tepid warnings about their potential mis-use, to silence.
CONCLUSION
The upshot of all this is that at present there is no one unifying narrative at the IMF that coherently captures its approach to the crisis. This incoherence, coupled with a crisis of confidence among erstwhile neo-liberal economists, and with initiatives taken independently by developing countries during the crisis, suggests that we have entered a period of "productive incoherence" as concerns economic governance in the developing world. There is a new ad hocery in evidence today that we have not seen for the past quarter century or so. While confusion and ambiguity in policy design and implementation are generally seen by economists (and perhaps other social scientists) as problematic [though see Best, 2005] , in the current context of the onset of decay of the neo-liberal project they should instead be taken as productive of the opportunity for developing countries to engage in policy experimentation of their own 25 At the same time, the World Bank also continues to promote its usual program of small government and liberalization, as Wade [2010] argues.
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design. And on that score, the evidence seems to suggest that policymakers are not waiting for the permission granted by the emergence of a new, coherent theoretical model. They are instead muddling through (Colander, 2003) -experimenting, among other things, with diverse types of capital controls. And from the ad hoc and even inconsistent strategies now underway there just might emerge a widely diverse platform of new interventions that are tailored to the unique contexts that policymakers face across the developing world.
The ultimate outcome of these developments is uncertain, of course. It is possible that the neoliberal worldview may re-establish itself, not least because its advocates have proven remarkably adept at "paradigm maintenance" over the last three decades as Wade [1996) has noted and as Polanyi [1944:143] suggested long ago. Mirowski [2010] and Hodgson [2009] are pessimistic about the economic profession's ability to learn from its mistakes. And it might be that the center of the battle over policy space has shifted from the IMF to other arenas. As Gallagher [2010a] has shown, for example, there are powerful restrictions on the right to impose capital controls embodied in US bi-and multi-lateral trade and investment agreements, a view that the US Treasury appears to embrace even as the views on the matter by the IMF and those of the economics profession are changing rather significantly [Geithner, 12 April 2011] .
On balance, though, I would argue that it is best to conclude that the present conjuncture is one of increasing uncertainty and aperture-in economic ideas, IMF influence and policy, and, as a consequence of these, in developing country policy space. Helleiner [2010] is instructive on this point. He argues that those who are disappointed that the current crisis has not already generated a "Bretton Woods moment" marked by a new consensus over the contours of a new and progressive global policy regime fail to appreciate the nature of the time-consuming, contested and politically contingent process that culminated in the kinds of policies we associate with the Bretton Woods era. Helleiner emphasizes that the Bretton Woods agreement was preceded by an "interregnum"-a period of disturbance and discontinuity in the existing order-that in turn led to a constitutive phase of policy formation. Viewed from this perspective, we are now in another interregnum-a productive moment marked by the shaken confidence among economists and policymakers in the current economic order; increasing pragmatism among economists and leadership of governing economic institutions; diminished authority and influence of those 33 institutions; and increasing willingness and ability of national governments to chart their own course and challenge the IMF as they wrestle with the effects of the global crisis. It is vital that heterodox development economists not overlook the opportunities provided by these developments-incoherent and uneven though they may be-to press an agenda that enhances developmental policy space and greater ideational pluralism.
